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Abstract : The study aims to prove a correlation between fair value accounting and 
the financial crisis in European banking. The use of fair value accounting is 
considered to exacerbate the financial crisis and is the reason for the re-use of 
historical cost accounting. By using a logit regression model, this research proves 
that more fair value-oriented accounting indexes have a weaker relationship with 
the financial crisis in the banking system than more historically-oriented 
accounting. However, the grouping of fair value accounting valuation model into 
three levels creates different strength of the relationship with the financial crisis. 
The lower the level that is used in an accounting index, the stronger the association 
between fair value accounting and the financial crisis in the banking system. 
Moreover, it has been proven that the use of fair value accounting index on 
liabilities produces a stronger association with the financial crisis in the banking 
system than when it is used on assets. 
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1. Intruduction 
After the financial crisis in 2008 hit many businesses extensively, some claim that 
fair value accounting (FVA) adopted in certain accounting standards and financial 
regulations merely exacerbates financial turmoil (Jassa 2008; Veron, 2008; Khan, 
2010; Badertscher et al. 2012; Masoud and Daas, 2014). Experts are split into three 
camps on this issue: those who agree (criticism), disagree (defenders), and those who 
remain impartial (Laux and Leuz 2009; Shaffer 2010). Discussion on these issues 
intensifies after countries around the globe are urged to adopt IFRS which emphasizes 
the principle of fair value in asset and liability valuation (Laux and Leuz, 2009). 
To shed light on the relationship between FVA and the financial crisis, various 
analytical approaches have been offered. In general, there are two approaches to the 
analysis of the correlation between FVA accounting and financial crisis: qualitative 
(argumentative) and quantitative (empirical). Ryan (2008) divides the quantitative 
research approach into two, empirical-archival research (focusing on empirical 
evidence) and experimental behavioral research. Ryan (2008) further argues that the 
most likely exploration conducted by accountants in explaining the relationship 
between FVA accounting and financial crisis issues is an experimental behavior 
research method. The reason is that the data used to prove FVA contribution to the 
financial crisis in empirical research is limited. Previous FVA empirical researches 
(such as Barth, 1994), do not discuss its links with the financial crisis. 
Bonaci, Matis, and Strouhal (2010) note that 39 papers were already published in 
leading journals around the world from 2005-2009, dealing with themes related to fair 
value. Most of the – seven papers – are in the Journal of Accounting Research. 
Differing opinions expressed in those 39 papers can be classified into pros, cons, and 
neutral with most papers give theoretical reviews. After exploring the articles, they 
conclude that the FVA has been made a scapegoat for the crisis.  
Most of them criticize the practice of placing a fair value pricing model into three 
levels (level 1, 2 and 3). These levels reflect the mechanism of price formation and 
liquidity aspects. In level 1, (mark-to-market) prices are derived directly from active 
markets without any adjustment. Prices at level 2 are set from the observable input 
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identical to active markets or relevant markets. If level 2 price cannot be obtained, 
FVA level 3 is used in which price is determined using a model (mark-to-model). 
Possibility to use level 3 model has been criticized since it may trigger the financial 
sector (banking) rush. Prices in level 3 are more subjective and prone to potential 
managerial bias with more significant information risks, indicating measurement 
errors and the use of the improper model (Goh Et al., 2009). Moreover, level 3 prices 
inadvertently create opportunities for earnings management discretion (Fiechter and 
Meyer, 2010) 
Khan (2010) states that problems with FVA are associated with regulatory 
compliance on capital adequacy ratios and solvency of banking by regulators. If there 
is an event that the market responded with a decrease in the value of an asset or 
liability, the provisions of FVA can encourage companies to sell assets to avoid 
breaching the solvency limit. The result is the release of excess assets (fire sales) 
which may trigger a drastic decline in prices and increase chances for failure of the 
systemic financial system (Badertscher et al., 2012). The sale of these assets has a 
significant impact on prices in the short term when the market is not liquid. 
Khan (2010) argues that a drop below the 10th of percentile bank's monthly 
return as influenced by difficulties of the banking system during a period of 
observation (time-series) is seen as a proxy for a financial crisis. Badertscher et al., 
(2012) and Allen and Carletti (2008) identified crisis as the drastic fall in asset prices 
due to massive asset sales to maintain the required capital ratio. For that reason, they 
examine the impact of FVA to the crisis by making a comparison between the sale of 
banking assets valued at fair value method before the crisis and during the crisis. The 
results of empirical testing of the two approaches above also yield different 
conclusions. Khan (2010) concluded that increased systemic risk in the banking 
network is associated with the presence of FVA. On the other hand, Badertscher et al., 
(2012) prove that FVA is not associated with the crisis because there is no increase in 
the sales of securities during the crisis. 
Another camp, in response to these contradicting claims, believes that historical 
accounting (HCA) can be a solution. However, the issue is merely argumentative, and 
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no empirical research has existed in support of this opinion. Hence, a study that 
provides empirical evidence about the relationship between FVA and HCA on the 
financial crisis is required. Furthermore, a question remains unanswered about which 
level out of all three levels of FVA that lends the most impact on the crisis. This study 
analyzes European banks using logit regression method. Results of this study are 
expected to unravel the exact facts about the issue of fair value accounting linkages 
with the crisis. 
 
2. Theoretical Basis and Hypothesis Development 
2. 1. Fair Value Accounting Definition 
SFAS 157 defines fair value as "the price to be received to sell an asset or 
liability in regular transfer payments transactions between market participants at the 
measurement date". IAS 50 (revised 2010) defines fair value as "the value of an asset 
could be exchanged or a liability settled between knowledgeable, willing parties to 
conduct fair transactions (arm's length transaction)". According to Shaffer (2010), 
fair value is defined as 'an exit price that can be observed in an orderly market'. 
Appraisers determine fair value as the price at which property would be exchanged 
willingly between buyers and sellers, with each having knowledge of all relevant 
facts and both are seen as equal (King, 2006). 
In SFAS No. 50 (revised 2010), fair value is broadly divided into two, prices 
quoted from an active market and other valuation techniques. These other valuation 
techniques include fair, updated market transactions between informed and willing 
parties, if available; references to current fair value from another instrument that is 
substantially the same; discounted cash flow analysis; and option pricing model. 
When prices are available in active markets for similar assets or liabilities, they 
should be used as a measurement to fair value (level 1). Otherwise, level 2 prices 
should apply for observable inputs, including quoted prices for assets or liabilities in 
active markets, cited prices for identical or similar assets in inactive markets, and 
other relevant market data. If it still does not exist, level 3 prices apply to 
unobservable inputs. The 3rd level uses a model to draw the fair value. 
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Definition of fair value is based on several assumptions: a) the price obtained is 
the output price (exit price), and it is a transaction between market participants; b) 
market participants who are involved should have free will concerning assets or 
liabilities and are not coerced; c) in the case of a forced sale, purchase and sale 
transactions are not carried out by market participants (Krumwiede, 2008) 
 
2. 2. The position of FVA and Crisis 
Laux and Leuz (2009) review some critical points of debate around the issue of 
FVA and crises that need attention. First, the controversy about FVA is due to 
confusion over what is new and different from the FVA and differing views about the 
purpose of the FVA. Second, there is no absolute clarity on FVA implementation 
stipulated in accounting standards. It is possible, however, that the standards 
themselves are the source of the problem because they allow uniformity of 
application due to allowable deviations under certain conditions. Third, the Historical 
Cost Accounting (HCA) is not a solution because there are some essential aspects of 
HCA and the problem is even more extensive than the FVA.  Fourth, implementation 
turns out to be a vital issue for connection with litigation. 
Not only does SFAS statement 115 divide securities into trading, available-for-
sale, and held-to-maturity along with their listing requirements, it also affects how 
earnings are reported. If an asset rated using FVA has more/less value than the book 
value, it will be recorded as a profit/loss. Such profit/loss can be added into net 
income or comprehensive profit depending on whether the excess is temporary or 
permanent. A temporary surplus will be reported in comprehensive income and 
permanent one (other-than-temporary impairment / OTTI) in net income. Making 
such a decision is also the prerogative management. Badertscher et al. (2010) prove 
that the sale of securities (AFS and Held to Maturity / HTM) that the sale of 
securities (AFS and Held to Maturity / HTM) is not affected by any component of 
earnings but changes to OTTI and decrease in capital ratio. Changes to OTTI do not 
affect the primary capital of most major banks with insignificant sales pressure and 
procyclical behavior (Shaffer, 2010). 
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Sapra (2008) shows that HCA is not suitable for the projection of sustainability 
(inefficient continuation). FVA, on the other hand, can be used to make a more 
precise prediction because it is more informative; the demands for full power is 
based on current price signals. However, such liquid judgment has severe contagious 
effects. As a result, conclusions drawn from FVA can only be better than those from 
HCA under a condition that losses due to contagion is relatively smaller than the 
losses from inefficient continuation. 
Results of Barth's research (1994) shows that the fair value of investment 
securities has a higher explanatory power than that of historical cost. However, when 
tested against profit/loss on securities, results can be different. In some 
specifications, the fair value gain/loss on securities does not have significant 
ascending explanatory power (incremental). While the estimated fair value of 
investment securities seems reliable and relevant for investors in bank equity 
valuation, fair value gain/loss on securities does not. 
 
2. 3. Banking Systemic Risk 
Systemic risk is the probable decline or breakdown in a system, as opposed to a 
decline in individual parts or components (Kaufman and Scott, 2000). According to 
Khan (2010), the core concept of systemic risk in banking is the notion of interbank 
contagion. Contagion, as Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005) suggests, is an expectation 
that is too strong or too weak about economic fundamentals. In general, contagion 
refers to the intention behind the spread of market turmoil during a declining 
condition (downside), from one country to another as an observed process through 
co-movement, exchange rate, stock prices, the distribution of sovereignty and capital 
flows. The essence of systemic risk is a contagion effect, another form of various 
external effects (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000). Hence, the two terms are often used 
interchangeably. 
Generally, contagion is divided into two categories (Karolyi, 2004). The first 
category emphasizes co-movement in financial asset prices as a result of normal 
interdependence between market economies coming from connectedness between the 
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real and financial economy (fundamental-based contagion). The second category 
highlights financial panic (irrational contagion), follow the herd behavior, loss of 
confidence and a rise in risk-aversion attitudes. Karolyi (2004) adds that the 
conception of 'irrational co-movements' as a form of contagion focuses on excessive 
co-movement in the price contained on capital flow, volatility or market disruptions 
and market real return assets. 
 
2. 4. Hypothesis development 
Institutional banking networks (linkages) are becoming more common 
nowadays, and interdependence among them help make the financial position more 
inter-connected (Kiyotaki and Moore, 2002). If the market is in an unstable condition 
(crisis), the price formation mechanism may become erratic and volatile. Assessment 
of an asset or liability based on market price quotations undoubtedly can change a 
company's financial position owing to extreme irrationality (emotion) of market 
participants. In such circumstances, the use of FVA will aggravate the crisis. When 
the banking and financial sector are globally connected, the shocks at one bank can 
spread quickly to other banks (Gropp et al. 2009; Iyer and Peydro 2010). 
There are at least two reasons to support the opinion that the application of FVA 
rules has exacerbated the financial crisis (Badertscher et al., 2010). First, when a 
crisis occurs, the market price is a poor indicator for long-term assessment of certain 
assets. Second, there is a sale pressure pushing the market price below fundamental 
value because banks embark on fire sales offering their assets as a response to price 
volatility and to maintain their capital ratio. Under FVA rules, banks are forced to 
mark down the value of their assets below fundamental value due to the absence of a 
capital guarantee which may lead to price reduction. 
As linkage among banks grows stronger, banks with significant capital position 
or money-center banks assume considerable importance. Policies that they make will 
have a broad impact. Any performance of major banks will be likely to affect other 
banks through the mechanism of FVA. This is evident from the fact that companies 
with a low capital ratio which happen to make slow sales also suffer from a similar 
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impact as companies with a high capital ratio (Badertscher et al., 2010). This means 
that there is a higher probability that a bank suffers from a downside return when 
money-center banks perform poorly when the accounting index is fair value-oriented. 
Based on the description above, the first hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
H1: a fairer value-oriented accounting index is associated with the financial crisis 
in the banking system 
 
Allen and Carletti (2008) propose that the use of FVA (mark-to-market) is not 
intended to increase welfare because it creates a contagion among banks and 
insurance sector. They argue that a similar condition does not occur in HCA. On the 
one hand HCA, unlike FVA, fails to reflect the appreciation of the current market 
assets valuation as reflected in price signals. On the other hand, FVA potentially adds 
endogenous volatility to the forming price (Sapra, 2008). In an interconnected 
market, this will only aggravate the crisis. 
It should also be noted that the formation of prices in the market does not 
always reflect the fundamental value of assets or liabilities (Laux and Leuz, 2009). It 
is almost impossible to combine the need for relevance and reliability of accounting 
information in a single method of assessment (Suwardjono, 2005:179). Thus, the 
claim that FVA is superior to HCA is questionable. Moreover, FVA utilizes three 
levels in which markets will respond differently (Goh et al. 2009). Because FVA is 
relatively short-lived in nature and liquid compared to HCA (Sapra, 2008), its 
application in a moment of crisis needs prudence. On the contrary, the long-lived 
HCA is better in preventing companies from falling into bankruptcy resulting from 
short selling or 'fire-sales'. HCA is more capable of dampening price shocks arising 
from the illiquid market because price formation is more stable. 
However, there has been no research that provides empirical evidence about the 
advantages of FVA over HCA or vice versa. If the linkage between FVA and HCA is 
a trade-off, the historical accounting should not be associated with the crisis. 
Furthermore, this study took a sample of European countries not experiencing severe 
losses due to the financial crisis in 2008 as the USA did. During this condition, the 
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alleged historical accounting used by European banks proves to reduce or at least 
does not exacerbate the crisis. Based on the description above, the second hypothesis 
is formulated as follows: 
H2: a more historical cost-oriented accounting index is associated with the 
financial crisis in the banking system† 
 
In the FVA mechanism, liquidity is a factor that the market focus on (Laux and 
Leuz, 2009). Goh et al. (2009) prove that the market underappreciates an asset 
assessed using a mark-to-model method the market as compared to an asset valued at 
mark-to-market method. This means that the lower the valuation model used by banks, 
the higher the chances for the market not to respond. However, if the bank is audited 
by better auditors or the banks have excess capital adequacy, the price of fair value of 
assets will be higher. This is a loophole that company management can exploit to 
manage earnings by making discretion of illiquid assets (unverifiable fair value) 
(Ramanna and Watts, 2007) 
The subjectivity and measurement errors in the assessment of mark-to-model may 
lead to a bias in the formation of price. As a consequence, investors may find 
themselves in higher risk and lower quality of information. This is the reason market 
participants consider that mark-to-model assets are lower than the mark-to-market. 
Thus, the greater t h e  d i s p e r s i o n  o f  t h e  valuation of fair value from the 
primary model, the greater the contribution to the crisis. 
 
† 
Based on ways of expressing hypothesis and the principle of consistency, the writer 
expresses only the second hypothesis in the form of alternative hypotheses. The expected 
significance is the null hypothesis, as constructed according to the previous argument. 
Based on the above description, the proposed third hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: the accounting index method that is more oriented to low-level fair value 
correlates more strongly with the financial crisis in the banking system 
 
Khan (2010) formulates fair value by combining securities account assets and 
liabilities at the same time (held-to-maturity, available for sale, trading assets, 
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mortgage servicing rights, other financial assets, derivative contracts, trading 
liabilities, and other financial obligations). The proxy is not appropriate because 
assets and liabilities have different characteristics, especially the credit risk and the 
debt value. Several studies have shown links between increased credit risk and the 
impact of negative net equity value (Vassalou and Xing, 2004). For that reason, the 
FVA valuation should treat assets and liabilities differently based on their 
contribution to the financial crisis 
Barth et al. (2008) demonstrate that equity returns are negatively related to changes 
in credit risk. This relationship will be less negative when firms have more debt. 
Also, they assert that these findings empirically associate and indicate the existence 
of two and countervailing and robust relationship. The linkages between the impacts 
of equity value and an increase in credit risk may: (1) lower the value of equity 
probably as a result of asset impairment, (2) raise the value of equity-related decline 
in the value of debt, possibly coming from a decline in asset values or an increase in 
asset risk. They conclude that an increase (decrease) in equity value correlates to a 
decrease (increase) in a value of the debt that comes from the increase (decrease) in 
credit risk. 
This study suspects that FVA valuation on liability would be more influential to the 
banking crisis than FVA valuation on an asset. Shaffer (2010) points out a capital 
decrease experienced by most banks is more likely due to loan portfolio rather than 
an influence of FVA (assets) during the crisis. Also, Fiechter and Meyer (2010) 
prove that level 1 fair value of liability contributes more positively to the level of 
financial discretion (earnings management) compared to level 1 fair value of assets. 
Based on the description above, the proposed fourth hypothesis is as follows: 
H4: the index method of accounting that is more oriented to a fair value of liabilities 
associates more strongly with the financial crisis in the banking system than the fair 
value of assets 
3. Research Method 
3.1. Sampling 
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Samples for the study were banking industry in Europe from 2005 to 2010, 
taken using purposive sampling method available at OSIRIS database FEB UGM. 
European banking industry was selected as samples because it has adopted IFRS 
since 2005 (Armstrong et al. 2010). Most discussions about systemic risk are 
focusing on the banking industry (Nijskens and Wagner, 2010; Festic et al. 2011). 
Banking is a sector that has the most number of assets in its balance sheet assessed 
using fair value (Goh et al., 2009). Second, the European banking industry seems to 
have more aversion to FVA than its American counterpart (Laux and Leuz, 2009). 
Third, post-crisis growth in Europe is experiencing a slowdown since several major 
European banks have assets that exceed the amount of their respective country's GDP 
(Overtveldt, 2009:187). Currently, the whole world is watching the European 
continent in anticipation of spreading crisis (Goodhart, 2011). 
 
3.2 Hypothesis Testing Model 
The model used in this study refers to the model used by Khan (2010) with 
some modifications. Khan (2010) uses a logit model to test whether banks in a 
particular month display tendency to get the lowest return of their return time series 
and when the index of money center banks also gets a bad return, they increase as a 
method of reporting is more fair value oriented. The logit model is used because it 
can calculate the nonlinearity return relationship in the worst market condition, 
allowing for additional risk factors and conditions while leaving the degree of 
dependence (tail dependencies). To test H1 and H2, the models used are: 
RKi,t = α1 + α2RBPUt + α3ANWt + α4RBPUt*ANWt + α5AHt + α6RBPUt*AHt + 
α7LNASETIi,t + α8 T1i,t + errori,t                                                            (1) 
 
Description: 
RK:         return times of crisis, banks rated one when i return to time t under the 10th 
percentile of the return period of observations (time series) bank i and zero 
if the other 
RBPU:  return the money center banks, a proxy for financial difficulties in the 
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banking system which is considered one when the monthly return equally-
weight index of money center bank under the 25th percentile within this 
index return observations and zero if the other. Determination of money 
center bank is based on the capitalization of the largest capital in each EU 
country 
ANW: fair value accounting, which is used to measure whether the accounting is fair 
value oriented. ANW is calculated from the ratio of the value of assets that 
are recognized or disclosed at fair value by the banks to the value of total 
assets 
AH:      historical accounting, the net assets that are not assessed with fair value. 
             AH was calculated from the net assets (net assets) minus the ANW 
LNASETI: natural logarithm of a bank assets 
T1      : the ratio of tier 1 bank capital 
 
H1 acceptance criteria could be seen from the level of significance and the positive 
direction of α4, while acceptance criteria H2 could see from no significance of α6. 
To test the H3 model (1) above the variable ANW will be split into two tiers 
(levels). 
 
ANW1 or level 1 is the asset prices traded in an active market (mark-to-market), is 
ANW2 or level 2 is an illiquid asset is derived from mark-to-model (Goh et al., 2009). 
 
ANW2 itself is a proxy for a combination of fair value accounting model level 2 and 
level 3 with consideration of data availability. To test the H3 model used is: 
 
RKi,t = β1 + β2RBPUt + β3ANW1t + β4ANW2t + β5RBPUt*ANW1t + 
           β6RBPUt*ANW2t + β7LNASETIi,t + β8 T1i,t + errori,t                       (2) 
 
Description: 
ANW1: the ratio of the amount of assets that are recognized or disclosed at fair 
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value at level 1 to total assets 
ANW2: the ratio of the amount of assets that are recognized or disclosed at fair 
value level 2 and level 3 to total assets 
H3 acceptance criteria can be seen from the magnitude coefficient β5 and β6. 
Larger coefficient indicates a stronger relationship to the financial crisis and 
vice versa. The expected value of the β6 coefficient is greater than the β5 
coefficient. To test H4, the model used is 
 
RKi,t = γ1 + γ2RBPUt + γ3ANWt + γ4ANWLt + γ5RBPUt*ANWt + 
            γ6RBPUt*ANWLt + γ7LNASETIi,t + γ8 T1i,t + errori,t (3) 
 
Description: 
ANWL: the ratio of the amount of liabilities that are recognized or disclosed at fair 
value to total assets 
 
H4 acceptance criteria can be seen from the comparison of scale coefficients γ6 and 
γ5. Based on the hypothesis, the expected value γ6 coefficient is greater than γ5 
coefficient values. 
 
3.3. Data Analysis Techniques 
Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analysis is a process of collecting, presenting and summarizing various 
characteristics of the data to describe the data. It was used to determine the average 
value, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of variables studied. 
 
The Selection of Best Model 
Statistical tools to process data in this study was STATA Special Edition (SE) 12 
from StataCorp LP (October 13, 2011), which can process the type of logit 
regression equations with sample type data time-series and cross-section at a time 
(panel data). Also, SPSS 16 was also used. 
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The process to select a model was done in two stages, multicollinearity test and 
comparison of panel logit model estimator. Multicollinearity test was performed to 
ensure that multicollinearity would not damage the model. After that, the best model 
estimate was selected among several possible methods of data processing panel (FE, 
RE, PA, and pooled data). The obtained logit regression method of panel data was 
used to test the hypotheses model. 
 
Discussion of Hypothesis Testing Results 
Theoretical and logical reasons must accompany evidentiary support or rejection of 
the hypothesis. When a particular fact does not fit into predictions or the researcher 
needs to collect more evidence, an additional analysis (robustness test) can be done. 
All of this will be summarized in the chapter discussing the results of hypothesis 
testing. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 Descriptive Statistics 
The average value of 0.399 ANW can be interpreted that the average amount of 
assets valued at the fair value of the European banking accounting is 39.9% of total 
assets owned. If fair value accounting (ANW) is divided into 2, ANW1 has a lower 
average value (0.14812) than ANW2 (0.25071), which means that the proportion of 
European banking assets valued at fair value using the method of mark-to-market is 
14.8% on average, while assets valued using mark-to-model method is 25.1% on 
average. It appears both variables have mean values that do not show much 
difference from the median value or can be said to be distributed relatively balanced. 
 
Table 21. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Min Max SD 
rk 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.501 
rk1 -0.002 0.014 -0.923 1.969 0.449 
rbpu 0.333 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.472 
rbpu1 0.009 0.057 -0.659 0.515 0.384 
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anw 0.399 0.385 0.375 0.464 0.031 
ah -0.356 -0.342 -0.429 -0.326 0.035 
anw1 0.148 0.137 0.092 0.261 0.056 
anw2 0.251 0.248 0.203 0.298 0.037 
anwl 0.213 0.206 0.165 0.309 0.047 
lnaseti 18.872 18.916 14.551 22.060 1.628 
t1 8.815 8.200 3.400 27.130 2.483 
anwi 0.256 0.228 0.023 0.769 0.158 
Number of observation (n): 318. 
rk1:         return banking (rk) in the form of ratios 
rbpu1 :     return the money center banks (rbpu) in the form of ratios 
anwi:       accounting fair value of a bank 
 
To interpret the AH variables, it is necessary to understand how they are 
derived, i.e., assets minus net assets that have been valued at fair value (Goh et al., 
2009). Therefore, AH is not a proportion of the remaining (residual) to total assets in 
a financial statement structure. Proxy is more appropriately described as the 
antithesis of net assets proportion which is compared to the proportion of assets 
valued at fair value. On average, European banks have assessed the composition of 
liabilities at fair value (ANWL) of 21.25% over the asset with the lowest proportion 
of 16.48% and the highest proportion of 30.88%. From liability risk viewpoint, the 
proportion appears to be quite moderate. 
 
Model Selection 
STATA SE 12 can also display descriptive statistics panel data to facilitate the initial 
analysis. If most of the observed variables tend to have a variation on aspects of the 
between, the model does not fit for testing using the FE, but the RE or PA (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2009:607). In observation of the RK and the other main independent 
variables, the most significant variance is seen on the within, so the possibility of the 
model used is the FE or PA. 
 
Multicollinearity Test 
Gujarati (2003:75) states the 10th classic assumption in the use of the least squares 
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method is free from perfect multicollinearity. If there is high multicollinearity (near 
multicollinearity) but not perfect (imperfect), the model is still BLUE (Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimator). Because this study uses interaction variables, multicollinearity 
will surely occur. Theoretically, these variables cannot be eliminated because they 
are the subject of the main problems in this study. Multicollinearity becomes a 
problem when it is perfect or very high, causing the resulting estimates are no longer 
precise. For problems of perfect multicollinearity, STATA 12 will automatically 
discard (drop) the problematic variable. Multicollinearity problem occurs in all the 
previous hypothesis testing model because there is more than one interaction 
variable. Therefore, the hypothesis testing model changes done by separating the 
variables having perfect multicollinearity, so that the model equations obtained are: 
 
RKi,t = α1 + α2RBPUt + α3ANWt + α4RBPUt*ANWt + α5LNASETIi,t + α6 T1i,t + errori,t 
(4) 
RKi,t =η1 + η2RBPUt + η3AHt + η4RBPUt*AHt + η5LNASETIi,t + η6 T1i,t + errori,t (5) 
RKi,t =β1 + β2RBPUt + β3ANW1t + β4RBPUt*ANW1t + β5LNASETIi,t + β6 T1i,t + 
errori,t      (6) 
RKi,t =δ1 + δ2RBPUt + δ3ANW2t + δ4RBPUt*ANW2t + δ5LNASETIi,t + δ6 T1i,t +   
errori,t    (7) 
RKi,t =γ1 + γ2RBPUt + γ3ANWLt + γ4RBPUt*ANWLt + γ5LNASETi,t + γ6 T1i,t + errori,t 
             (8 ) 
 
Hypothesis testing criteria must be adjusted due to changes in the model. 
Hypothesis 1 can be accepted if α4 is proved to be statistically significant and H2 can 
be accepted if η4 proved to be statistically significant. Acceptance of H3 will be seen 
from the statistical significance of δ4 and β4, with a value of δ4 greater than the 
coefficient β4. Hypothesis 4 can be accepted with the provision of the γ4 coefficient 
value greater than the coefficient of α4 and statistically significant.  
The consequences of the separation model for the independent variable being 
tested is the possibility that there are differences in the estimated predictions of each 
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model (Incomparable). To ensure that the two models being compared are equal and 
are not disturbed by significant factors outside the model, the mean values predicted 
by the regressor over regressand of compared models are tested. It is expected the 
two models being compared have similar mean values. 
 
The comparison panel logit model estimator 
PA method has a panel logit model estimator better than FE (not shown). FE model 
equations cannot be completed due to failure to achieve convergence and no change 
at an iterative process. Iterative is one method to linearize equations until no 
substantial changes can be reached in the estimated value of the nonlinear model 
(NLRMs) (Gujarati, 2003:569). In STATA syntax 12 FE model calculations (and 
RE) must be terminated by force with the cue-Break-. For this reason, the PA method 
was chosen as a testing model panel data in this study. Distance variance-covariance 
matrix of the estimators (VCE) can be minimized with the command syntax vce 
(robust). Another additional syntax is Corr () to put different restrictions on the 
relationship error. In the study option Corr (exchangeable) was used to set ρ_ts = ρ 
for all s ≠ t, so the error is assumed equicorrelated. After these two options were 
added, the command syntax used in this study is xtlogit depvar [indepvar] [if] [in] 
[weight] [, pa corr (exch) vce (robust)] 
 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Univariate Analysis 
The analysis was conducted to see an early indication of proof hypotheses 
before entering the control variables. When the value of RBPU reached 1, at the 
average of 87.7% return of other banks also dropped. It means that when the main 
banks were experiencing difficulties or performing poorly (their return was below the 
25th percentile), most of the other banks (88%) were affected. This condition 
indicates the existence of a contagion effect from major banks to other banks in the 
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European banking system. The difference between the averages RK also proved 
significant. 
When the value of RBPU and D_ANW1 became 1, the return of 87.7% of banks 
decreased, whereas when the value was 0, the return of 30.2% of banks declined. 
Therefore when banks opt for fair value accounting level 1 on the asset side and 
when the return of major banks decreases, 87.7% of other banks will also be affected. 
At RBPU and D_AH value 1, there are still 75.5% of affected banks. It indicates the 
strong impact of large banks in the European banking system. Because interactions 
between variables D_ANW2 and RBPU did not yield value of 1, there was no 
prediction of RK value in times of crisis. 
 
Table 2 Summary of Univariate Analysis 
 
 Number of 
Observation 
Mean prediction of 
RK (rkhat) 
Independent Variable: RBPU   
RBPU = 0 212 0.3018956 
RBPU = 1 106 0.8773525 
Mean different of RK  0.5754569*** 
Independent Variable: RBPU and D_ANW   
RBPU*D_ANW = 0 265 0.3924528 
RBPU*D_ANW = 1 53 0.999832 
Mean different of RK  0.6073792*** 
Independent Variable: RBPU and D_AH   
RBPU*D_AH = 0 265 0.4414181 
RBPU*D_AH = 1 53 0.754717 
Mean different of RK  0.3132989*** 
Independent Variable: RBPU and D_ANW1   
RBPU*D_ANW1 = 0 212 0.3018868 
RBPU*D_ANW1 = 1 106 0.8773585 
Mean different of RK  0.5754717*** 
Independent Variable: RBPU and D_ANWL   
RBPU*D_ANWL = 0 212 0.3022532 
Ihda Arifin Faiz et al. 
19 
 
RBPU*D_ANWL = 1 106 0.8775741 
Mean different of RK  0.5753209*** 
Description: 
1. *** Statistically significant in the 1% level. 
2. Each independent variable-value ratio (except RBPU) used as a dummy variable with 
a provision judged as having a value greater than the median value and rated 0 if 
otherwise. 
 
Results 
Table 3 Summary of coefficient values and the significance of the main 
variables of each model 
Model Variable Code Coefficient 
4 RBPU*ANW b_anw 22.91913 
5 RBPU*AH b_ah -19.66224 
6 RBPU*ANW1 b_anw1 89.11543*** 
7 RBPU*ANW2 b_anw2 -784.6085*** 
8 RBPU*ANWL b_anwl 77.73877*** 
*** Statistically significant in the 1% level. 
 
To ensure that the models compared are equal and are not disturbed by significant 
factors outside the model, the mean values predicted by the regressor over regressand 
of compared models are tested. The test results prove that there is no significant 
difference between models so that the resulting coefficient values can be compared 
directly. 
Table 3 shows that while hypothesis 1 is not supported, hypothesis 2 is. The test 
results are contrary to the results of a research by Khan (2010) which proves the 
existence of a relationship-oriented accounting fair value of the index with an 
increased risk of systemic banking, but in agreement with results of a research by 
Badertscher et al. (2010) that rejects the claim that fair value accounting exacerbates 
the financial crisis in the American banking industry. This is because cross-border 
bank contagion in the European banking industry only occurs in large banks (Grop et 
al., 2009). Also, there is a tiered cross-border interbank structure in Europe that have 
multiple channels to connect a chain effect of inter-banking. 
B_anw2 variable coefficient value (absolute) is higher than b_anw1 variables, in 
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support of hypothesis 3. That is, the accounting valuation models using the fair value 
of the lower level is more strongly associated (absolute) with the financial crisis in 
the banking system. These results are consistent with the results of research by Goh 
et al. (2009) who conclude that the market less values the fair value of assets with a 
lower valuation (using mark-to-model). This will potentially be exploited by 
management to perform discretionary or earnings smoothing because there are 
judgment aspects in it (Fiechter and Meyer, 2010). 
The empirical test also supports hypothesis 4, that index more oriented to 
accounting fair value on the liability side is more related to the financial crisis in the 
banking system than on the asset side. These results concur with Fiechter and Meyer 
(2010) who prove that the level of fair value on liability side has a positive and 
significant impact on financial discretion (earnings management) compared to level 1 
fair value on assets. These findings indicate that the use of fair value accounting on 
the credit side is riskier than on the asset side. It supported by Wang and Zhang 
(2017) research finding that firms use more fair value measures in financial 
statements associated with greater demand for convertible debt and debt with short 
maturity. 
 
Additional analysis 
Here is some additional analysis that provides empirical support for the 
proposed study. First, the significant relationship among ANW1, ANW2, and 
ANWL variables only occur in the context of the accounting measurement of 
a systemic downward trend in the index return. This relationship did not apply 
when the object was tested on personal banking. 
Second, the variable money center banks (RBPU) seem to have different 
behavior with the results of testing Khan (2010) for the decrease in bank 
return. This is because there is a layered structure of European banking 
(Gropp et al., 2009) which amplifies the rejection of hypothesis 1. There is a 
possibility that the influence of major banks on other banks in the European 
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banking system does not take the same pattern as it does in the American 
banking industry. Corporation uses more fair value accounting associated 
with a higher level of cash holdings (Bick, Orlova, and Sun, 2018). Moreover, 
by using fair value accounting, firms’ analysts may have more accurate 
earnings forecasts (Ayres, Huang, and Myring, 2017). 
Third, the negative coefficient ANW2 indicates that the growing 
tendency of banks to use low-level fair value accounting index will reduce the 
tendency of banks to experience decreased return. This negative influence 
takes the same direction as AH variable but in opposite direction of RBPU 
against RK. The negative relationship is likely to be nonlinear in the 
parameters. It can also be caused by differences in the mechanisms or 
channels influence the major banks in the banking system. 
Interaction of RBPU against ANW1, when compared to the interaction of 
RBPU against ANW2 interaction, shows a decline in banking return and 
works in the opposite. The practice of using fair value accounting index level 
1 when significant banks are performing poorly contributes to the decline of 
returns of other banks. However, this condition is not found when fair value 
accounting index is lower. 
 
5. Conclution 
 5.1. Conclusion 
This study aims to obtain empirical evidence of a relationship between fair value 
accounting and the financial crisis of the European banking industry. By using the 
logit regression model, the study validates that a more fair-value-oriented accounting 
index is not associated with the financial crisis in the banking system, quite the 
contrary of the use of the more historically-oriented accounting index. However, the 
division of accounting valuation models of fair value into three levels has created 
different strength of relationships over the financial crisis. The lower level used in a 
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fair value accounting index is strongly associated with the financial crisis in the 
banking system. Moreover, this study also validates that the use of fair value 
accounting index on liabilities has a closer link with the financial crisis in the 
banking system than the use of fair value accounting index on an asset. 
Apart from creating different strengths of the relationship, the division of fair 
value accounting into three levels also lends different influence on the direction of 
the financial crisis of the banking system. The fair value accounting method that uses 
mark-to-market (high level) has a positive effect, while the fair value method of 
accounting mark-to-model (low level) shows a negative impact on the improvement 
of the financial crisis the banking system. The direction of both influences over 
money center banks is in the opposite of each other. The additional analysis and 
previous researches concur with this study that a fairer value-oriented accounting 
index has a positive effect on large banks and not on the public banking system. At 
the same time, this finding supports a layered structure of the European banking 
system. 
5.2 Suggestions for Future Researches 
As an improvement to the limitations of this study, some suggestions can be 
made for future researches, i.e.: 
1. There should be more samples and longer observation time and additional 
appropriate control variables to produce better-grounded conclusions. 
2. There is a need to observe other banking systems. If it proves that there is a strong 
relationship between the use of fair value accounting index and financial crisis in 
the banking system, causality research can be done. 
3. A better understanding of the appropriate use of proxy of accounting variables of 
fair value and historical accounting is needed to produce a better conclusion about 
a proxy that reflects reality better. 
4. There is a need to delve deeper into the division of fair value accounting model 
into three levels to better understand the nature of these levels and their influence 
on the dependent variable.  
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